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Abstract
Machine learning has become rapidly utilized in cybersecurity, rising from almost non-existent to currently
over half of cybersecurity techniques utilized commercially. Machine learning is advancing at a rapid rate,
and the application of new learning techniques to cybersecurity have not been investigate yet. Current
technology trends have led to an abundance of household items containing microprocessors all connected
within a private network. Thus, network intrusion detection is essential for keeping these networks secure.
However, network intrusion detection can be extremely taxing on battery operated devices. The presented
work presents a cyberattack detection system based on a multilayer perceptron neural network algorithm.
To show that this system can operate at low power, the algorithm was executed on two commercially
available minicomputer systems including the Raspberry PI 3 and the Asus Tinkerboard. An analysis of
accuracy, power, energy, and timing was performed to study the tradeoffs necessary when executing these
algorithms at low power. Our results show that these low power implementations are feasible, and a scan
rate of more than 226,000 packets per second can be achieved from a system that requires approximately
5W to operate with greater than 99% accuracy.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Title Page

List of Figures
List of Tables
Introduction

1

Background

3

Neural Network Algorithms

4

Perceptron Learning Algorithms

5

Cyberattack Dataset

7

MATLAB Software Results

10

TensorFlow Software Results

12

Low Power Hardware Results

15

Conclusion

21

References

22

List of Figures
Figure 1. Two different multilayer perceptron topologies presented in

5

this paper including (a) a topology with one hidden layer and (b)
a topology with two hidden layers.
Figure 2. Examples of packets contained in the NSL-KDD dataset

9

displaying (a) a normal packet, and (b) an attack.
Figure 3. The two example packets in Figure 2 after processing for

9

neural network displaying (a) a normal packet, and (b) an attack.
Figure 4. Root mean squared error minimization curve for training of

10

multilayer perceptron algorithm with two hidden layers using
MATLAB.
Figure 5. Plots displaying training error over the 100 training iterations

12

for an MLP with (a) two hidden layers using 100% of the data for
training, (b) a single hidden layer using 100% of the data for
training, (c) two hidden layers and 50% of the data for training,
and (d) one hidden layer and 50% of the data for training.
Figure 6. Photographs of (a) the Raspberry PI 3 and (b) the Asus

15

Tinkerboard.
Figure 7. Power consumption during training when executing the MLP
with 2 hidden layers on (a) the Raspberry PI and (b) the
Tinkerboard (20 epoch training interval).

16

List of Tables
Table I. Accuracies for various Neural Networks Studied in Previous

4

Work.
Table II. Breakdown of Different Attack Types within the NSL-KDD

8

Dataset.
Table III. Accuracies during testing of multilayer perceptron algorithm

11

with two hidden layers using MATLAB.
Table IV. Different Multilayer Perceptron Topologies Used in this Work.

12

Table V. Classification Accuracy when Using 100% of the Data for

14

Training.
Table VI. Classification Accuracy when Using 50% of the Data for

14

Training.
Table VII. Power Consumption for Each of the MLP Systems During

17

Training.
Table VIII. Energy Per Training Epoch for Each of the Computing

18

Systems Executing Each of the Four MLP Cases.
Table IX. Energy Per Packet During Training for Each of the Computing

18

Systems Executing Each of the Four MLP Cases.
Table X. Energy Per Packet During Testing for Each of the Computing

18

Systems Executing Each of the Four MLP Cases.
Table XI. Execution Time Per Packet During Training for Each of the

19

Computing Systems Executing Each of the Four MLP Cases.
Table XII. Execution Time Per Packet During Testing for Each of the

20

Computing Systems Executing Each of the four MLP Cases.
Table XIII. Time Factors Showing How Much Speedup is Obtained for
Each System When in a Testing Mode.

20

Page |1

Introduction
Computer networks have steadily increased in size and complexity since their
inception. As computer networks grow, it becomes more difficult to provide reliable
network security [1], especially in low power portable systems. In current commercial
technology, many electronic devices and systems possess both a microprocessor and a
connection to a network. Unless each of these devices are equipped with up to date
network security, users are exposing their networks to a substantial number of access
points. Therefore, high speed energy efficient intrusion detection must be utilized to
protect systems from the rapidly evolving cyberattack landscape.
Intrusion detection systems that use neural networks and machine learning can be
utilized as an efficient alternative to traditional security systems. Neural networks are
extremely capable in the fields of image and pattern recognition [2,3]. These capabilities
can be leveraged in intrusion detection applications as the networks are trained to
recognize the difference between benign data and a cyberattack. Certain neural network
algorithms have adaptive properties [4], thus they can self-optimize during normal
operation. The ability to improve during while in use would be useful in an intrusion
detection system because new cyberattacks are constantly being developed. Therefore, it
would be possible for an adaptive system to catch new attacks without undergoing a
costly retraining process. Many neural network algorithms are implemented using layers
of vector-matrix multiplication [5]. This type of algorithm can be implemented in an
extremely parallel design using specialized low power hardware [5-10]. Thus, neural
network based intrusion detection could be performed at extreme low power.
Before low power, energy efficient machine learning based intrusion detection
systems are produced, different learning algorithms need to be examined to determine
which are most appropriate for recognizing attacks within network data. Thus, this work
presents a comparison of two perceptron topologies running on two different low power
hardware systems. For training and testing this work uses the NSL-KDD dataset [11], an
update to the Knowledge Discovery and Datamining dataset [12]. In this work we train
two different multilayer perceptron algorithms, one with a single hidden layer, and one
with two hidden layers. In addition to studying perceptron algorithm accuracy [1], in this
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work we study low power implementations of these algorithms on a Raspberry Pi 3 [13]
and an Asus Tinkerboard [14]. These minicomputers are low power (<6W), handheld
(<60g) computing systems with a high degree of flexibility. Our results present a design
space analysis that discusses the tradeoff of using these systems in terms of accuracy,
power, energy, and time. By using these systems, we show that network intrusion
detection can be implemented on lower power systems with greater than 99% accuracy
with a scanning rate of more than 226,000 packets / second.
Related work in this area shows similar studies where neural network algorithms
are used to carry out intrusion detection using similar training and testing datasets. Both
convolutional [15] and deep learning [16] architectures have been applied to this
problem, and these approaches achieve high accuracy, which is about 99% in some cases.
Hebbian learning has also been applied to the cyber-attack detection problem, and
significant detection improvement is observed when using a multiscale learning rule [17].
In our previous work, we compare perceptron algorithms that differ in size and
complexity in terms of attack detection accuracy [18]. Furthermore, our research group
has studied the implementation of network intrusion detection on more exotic hardware
architectures including the IBM True North spiking processor [19], as well as simulated
memristor hardware [20]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no published work has
carried out a power, energy, and timing comparison when moving these algorithms to
low size, weight, and power commercial off the shelf systems. The presented work
demonstrates the possibility efficiently implementing intrusion detection using low cost
components.
This work is organized as follows: Section II details the necessary background to
understand the objectives of this work, Section III describes neural network algorithms,
Section IV discusses the perceptron algorithms used in this work, and Section V
describes the NSL-KDD dataset used in this work. Section VI shows the results obtained
when training and testing one of the network topologies using MATLAB. Section VII
discusses the results found when training and testing the network topologies using
TensorFlow and low power hardware. Section VIII discusses the hardware evaluation
results that compare these networks in terms of power, energy, and time. Finally, Section
IX provides a brief conclusion.
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Background
Prior to implementing neural network layouts on a working knowledge of
machine learning, neural networks, and intrusion detection was developed. Traditional
network intrusion detection systems are general rule based (such as Snort). Because
traditional systems follow rules based on attacks that were previously determined to be
malicious, they are generally unable to recognize new attacks. New malicious attacks are
continuously created. Given the goal of our work is to develop a low power efficient
intrusion detection system, the traditional system would not be the most effective given
that it generally is not good at recognized new attacks. Therefore, our approach to
network intrusion detection is a neural network pattern based system that can potentially
recognize patterns among malicious attacks in order to identify them.
Neural networks have various practical applications including facial recognition,
voice recognition, and medical image recognition. Ultimately, the task was to develop
low power machine learning algorithms that can serve as efficient intrusion detection
systems given the power constants of low power systems. In order to develop the low
power intrusion detection system, we studied neural networks to determine which were
the most promising for detecting cyberattacks, we tested the neural networks for
efficiency using a portable computer, we then tested the neural networks for efficiency
using low power hardware.
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Neural Network Algorithms
Before determining which neural network algorithm to implement and test on low
power systems, a survey of previous studies using neural networks was completed. Table
I displays the previous work using neural networks for cyberattack detection and the
corresponding accuracies as reported in the studies. As shown in Table I, Multilayer
Perceptron Algorithms consistently have accuracies higher than 99% [15, 17, 18, 19].

Table I. Accuracies for Various Neural Networks Studied in Previous Work.

Network Algorithm

Accuracy (%)

Multiscale Hebbian

93.56

Deep Convolutional Network

98.83

Multilayer Perceptron – 1 hidden layer

99.85

Multilayer Perceptron – 2 hidden layers

99.68

Multilayer Perceptron – 3 hidden layers

99.78

Convolutional Neural Network – 1 layer

99.9

Convolutional Neural Network – 2 layers 99.8
Convolutional Neural Network – 3 layers 80.1
Deep Feed Forward – 1 layer

92.9

Deep Feed Forward – 2 layers

92.9

Deep Feed Forward – 3 layers

93.0

Deep Feed Forward – 4 layers

93.0

Deep Feed Forward – 5 layers

92.9

Key differences between the work depicted in Table 1 and the work that we have
done is that we will be testing the algorithms using low power systems.
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Perceptron Learning Algorithms
A neural network is a computing system inspired by human brain function. Neural
networks “learn” to complete tasks by recognizing patterns rather than following a set of
rules. They generally operate in two stages: training and testing. During the training
stage, the system is shown data which it then classifies. After the network makes a
classification determination, an error calculation is determined. Depending on how
accurate the system’s classifications were, weights will be updated accordingly. This
process will continue in stages until the system processes the data for a predetermined
number of stages. Once the process is complete the weights remain unchanged and the
system moves on to the testing stage. During the testing stage, the system is again shown
data to classify. After each data packet is classified, a final accuracy is determined. This
type of system could allow for real-time updates and feedback and could also prevent
new attacks.
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Figure 1. Two different multilayer perceptron topologies presented in this work including (a) a topology with one hidden layer
and (b) a topology with two hidden layers.

After surveying various types of neural network algorithms and other network
intrusion detection studies [19], the multilayer perceptron was determined to be the first
neural network type to examine on both a computer system and low power hardware.
Two layouts of the multilayer perceptron were tests, one with a single hidden layer and
one with two hidden layers (see Fig. 1). Perceptron algorithms possess two different
modes of operation, as discussed above, testing and training. During the training phase,
an iterative algorithm updates the weights w with the goal of minimizing error over time.
Once training is finished, the resulting network should provide strong classification
accuracy when presented with data like the training data. In this work, we utilize the
standard back-propagation training algorithm [22]. Corresponding to Fig. 1, the
intermediate output…
The multilayer perceptron in Figure 1 (a) contains one layer of neurons between
weight matrices wa and wb. The input pattern must traverse each of these layers before a
classification result is produced. Increasing the number of neurons layers in a perceptron
typically produces a system with a higher classification accuracy. With more layers, more
complex distinctions can be made as flexibility in feature classification is increased. Fig.
1 (b) shows multilayer perceptron with two hidden neuron layers. In the following
section, we analyze the differences between these two network layouts in terms of
accuracy, energy, and timing.
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Cyberattack Dataset
To train and evaluate the intrusion detection networks, we make use of an
improvement to the Knowledge Discovery and Datamining (KDD) data set which is
known to make the data more appropriate for examining the effectiveness of artificial
neural networks. This dataset is known as NSL-KDD [11]. NSL-KDD removes all
repeated identical data points from the KDD dataset [12] and provides more balance to
the different classes within the data.
More specifically, for the experiments in this work, the entirety of the data found
in the “KDDtrain+.txt” file was used and can be found at [11]. This dataset contains
several different types of cyberattacks and are detailed in Table II. Twenty-two different
attacks are present in this data, and a large amount of benign data is also present in this
data, and a large amount of benign data is also present. The systems presented in this
work must learn to distinguish between the normal data and the attack data with the
highest accuracy possible.
The differences between a normal packed (see Figure 2 (a)) and an attack packet
(see Figure 2 (b)) in the NSL-KDD dataset are not easily recognizable, but patterns in the
features are likely to emerge when scanning a large number of samples. To take
advantage of each of the features in this data during training and classification, some
minor preprocessing was performed. Each packet contains 43 values, and the 42nd value
(displayed as either normal or Neptune in Figure 2) was sued as a label during training.
The 43rd entry is a number related to classification difficulty which was removed and not
used in this experiment. Additionally, the twentieth entry has a value of 0 for all packets
in the dataset, so this value was removed from all packets since it would not affect
training accuracy. The features (displayed as tcp, http, and SF in Figure 2 (a)) were nonnumerical, so they were converted to integer values. For example, the fourth feature from
the left 9SF in Figure 2 (a)) is a label capable of storing one of eleven possible strings,
thus the string contained in this feature is now represented by a number 1 through 11
(depending on the string present). The data was also normalized (across samples) so that
the largest value in any feature column was 1. Figure 3 shows the same example packets
in Figure 2 after processing has been applied.
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Table II. Breakdown of Different Attack Types within the NSL-KDD Dataset.

Attack Type
back

Number in
Dataset
956

Attack Class
DOS

buffer_overflow 30

U2R

ftp_write

8

R2L

guess_passwd

53

R2L

imap

11

R2L

ipsweep

3599

PROBE

land

18

DOS

loadmodule

9

U2R

multihop

7

R2L

neptune

41214

DOS

nmap

1493

PROBE

normal

67343

NORMAL

perl

3

U2R

phf

4

R2L

pod

201

DOS

portsweep

2931

PROBE

rootkit

10

U2R

satan

3633

PROBE

smurf

2646

DOS

spy

2

R2L

teardrop

892

DOS

warezclient

890

R2L

warezmaster

20

R2L
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0,tcp,ftp_data,SF,491,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,2,2,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0.00,150,25,0.17,
0.03,0.17,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.05,0.00,normal,20

(a)
0,tcp,private,S0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
123,6,1.00,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.05,0.07,0.00,255,26,0.10,
0.05,0.00,0.00,1.00,1.00,0.00,0.00,neptune,19

(b)
Figure 2. Examples of packets contained in the NSL-KDD dataset displaying (a) a normal packet, and (b) an attack.

12



“normal” was removed from the pattern and correlated to an
attack type category number (that can be any number 1 to 23).

0,0.6667,0.300,0.9091,3.5581e-07,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0.0039,0.0039,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0.5882,
0.0980,0.1700,0.0300,0.1700,0,0,0,0.0500,0
(a)
“neptune” was removed from the pattern and
10



correlated to an attack type category number (that can be
any number 1 to 23).

0,0.6667,0.7143,0.5455,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0.2407,0.0117,1,1,0,0,0.0500,0.0700,0,1,0.1020,
0.1000,0.0500,0,0,1,1,0,0
(b)
Figure 3. The two example packets in Figure 2 after processing for neural network displaying (a) a normal packet, and (b) an
attack.

P a g e | 10

MATLAB Software Results
Prior to testing the chosen Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) algorithms for efficiency
on low power systems, the MLP algorithm with two hidden layers was analyzed using
MATLAB. Figure 4 shows the error minimization over several iterations of training. The yaxis is root mean squared error and the x-axis shows iterations of training. As shown in
the figure, as training progresses, error decreases.

Figure 4. Root mean squared error minimization curve for training of multilayer perceptron
algorithm with two hidden layers using MATLAB.

Following training, testing was completed. Table III shows the accuracy for
various training data sizes and iterations of training. This chart shows that as the training
data set size increases and as the number of iterations increases, accuracy generally
increases. Generally, this increases in accuracy comes with an increase in time as well.
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Table III. Accuracies during testing of multilayer perceptron algorithm with two hidden layers using
MATLAB.

Iterations

Training Data Set Size
1000

5000

10000

50000

100000

145586

2

60.33

96.86

97.42

98.18

98.64

98.85

5

60.33

97.32

97.6

98.63

98.78

99.18

10

91.74

97.59

98.33

99.01

99.58

99.7

20

97.22

98.42

98.67

99

99.6

99.67

30

97.39

98.53

98.82

99.01

99.68

99.73

50

97.4

98.49

98.36

99.66

99.71

99.76

100

97.44

98.85

98.95

99.71

99.78

99.78
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TensorFlow Software Results
Training
Table IV displays the two different perceptron topologies that were examined in
this work. In each case, the network was trained for 100 epochs and the root mean
squared error minimization curves are displayed in Figure 5.
Table IV. Different Multilayer Perceptron Topologies Used in this Work.

Network Type

Network Layout

MLP with 2 Hidden Layers

40→14→9→2

MLP with 1 Hidden Layer

40→14→2

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure. 5. Plots displaying training error over the 100 training iterations for a MLP with (a) two hidden layers using 100% of
the data for training, (b) a single hidden layer using 100% of the data for training, (c) two hidden layers and 50% of the data
for training, and (d) one hidden layer and 50% of the data for training.
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The input layer had 40 entries in each case, because this is the number values that
each data example contained after pre-processing the NSL-KDD dataset. Each of the
MLP networks in Table IV were trained using two different data arrangements.
First, to directly study the networks’ ability to train, all 125,973 packets in the
dataset were used for training (see Figures 5 (a) and (b)). This same dataset is then used
for testing. In the second data arrangement 50% of the packets were used for training and
the other 50% were used for testing (see Figures 5(c) and (d)). This will test the networks
ability to predict, as they will be tested on data that was not used during training. In each
case in Figure 5, training correctly shows error minimization as the number of training
epochs increases.

Testing and Evaluation
To judge each network layout in terms of how it can detect cyberattacks once
training is complete, this section discusses testing accuracy. Tables V and VI show the
testing results, and in each case these results represent an average of five identical
training and testing executions. This provides a fairer measure as it accounts for the
variation in the system, as weights will optimize differently with each run. Furthermore,
in the case where 50% of the data was used for training, this 50% is randomly selected,
and the testing and training datasets will differ for each run.
For the case where 100% of the data was used for training, that same data set was
applied to each of the network configurations for testing and these results are displayed in
Table V. When comparing the two different MLP layouts, the total accuracy is nearly
identical. When looking at the classification breakdown in Table V, it appears that the
system with one hidden layer is better at classifying attacks, and the system with two
hidden layers has fewer false positives.
When comparing the data in Table V to that in Table VI, accuracy falls slightly
when prediction is required to determine packet type, and this is to be expected. Again,
the difference in accuracy between the MLP with one hidden layer and the MLP with two
hidden layers is very small.
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Table V. Classification Accuracy when Using 100% of the Data for Training.

ANN Type

Accuracy

Hits

Correct Rejections

Misses False Positives

Single Hidden Layer

99.458%

58226.6

67064.4

403.4

278.6

Two Hidden Layers

99.441%

58119.6

67111.8

510.4

231.2

Table VI. Classification Accuracy when Using 50% of the Data for Training.

ANN Type

Accuracy

Hits

Correct Rejections

Misses

False Positives

Single Hidden Layer

99.190%

28828.6

33647.4

261.4

248.6

Two Hidden Layers

99.195%

28838.8

33640.2

251.2

255.8
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Low Power Hardware Results
After the accuracy was analyzed for these networks, they were ported to two
different minicomputer systems, the Raspberry PI 3 [13], and the Asus Tinkerboard [14].
Photos of each of these systems are displayed in Figure 6. The following subsections
describe power, energy, and time analysis of these systems when executing the presented
MLP networks.

(a)

(b)
Figure 6. Photographs of (a) the Raspberry PI 3 and (b) the Asus Tinkerboard.
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Power Analysis
For each of the test cases described in Tables V and VI, the MLP networks were
executed in Python scripts on each of these systems while a ‘watts up? PRO’ power
analyzer logged power consumption at regular intervals during runtime. Figure 7 shows
power consumption for each minicomputer when using the MLP with two hidden layers
to train the entire dataset for a 20 epoch interval.

Training Starts

Training Stops

(a)

(b)
Figure 7. Power consumption during training when executing the MLP with 2 hidden layers on (a)
the Raspberry PI and (b) the Tinkerboard (20 epoch training interval).

Likewise, Figure 7 shows the power consumption of each system when in
network packet evaluation mode. To generate a result with a higher resolution time
interval, the system was tested using the entire dataset 100 times.
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Similar results were obtained for each of the MLP cases and were used to
generate the analysis presented in the following tables. As in Table VII, we can subtract
the idle power present in each system to determine the dynamic power requirement when
executing these MLP scripts. Static Power was determined measuring each system’s idle
power for 300 seconds. The values and trends generated when testing these networks (as
opposed to training them) are very similar so that data is not displayed. The differences
between these systems in terms of energy is the more provocative result. Thus, the energy
analysis of these systems is presented in Tables VIII through X.
Table VII. Power Consumption for Each of the MLP Systems During Training.

Power Measurement

Raspberry PI

Tinkerboard

Idle Power

1.7429 W

2.7337 W

Dynamic Power One Hidden Layer

0.9571 W

2.1292 W

Total Power One Hidden Layer

2.7004 W

4.8629 W

Dynamic Power Two Hidden Layers

1.1428 W

2.2366 W

Total Power Two Hidden Layers

2.8857 W

4.9703 W

Energy Analysis
Using the power consumption and runtime data collected during execution,
energy consumption can also be determined for each of the MLP cases. Table VIII shows
energy consumption for an entire training epoch for each case, where HL denotes the
number of hidden layers in the network. Note that even though the Tinkerboard requires
slightly higher power, its energy consumption is lower due to its higher execution speed.
Table IX and X consider the per packet energy for training and testing respectively. The
energy per packet is essentially the same for each MLP architecture whether 50% or
100% of the data is used for training because the networks are identical in each case. Due
to the complexity of the training algorithm, an energy increase of nearly two orders of
magnitude is present for a single packet when compared to testing.
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Table VIII. Energy Per Training Epoch for Each of the Computing Systems Executing Each of the
Four MLP Cases.

Computing System
Network

Raspberry PI

Tinkerboard

2HL 100%

316.759 J

278.983 J

2HL 50%

143.200 J

137.325 J

1HL 100%

191.099 J

191.319 J

1HL 50%

100.443 J

96.655 J

Table IX. Energy Per Packet During Training for Each of the Computing Systems Executing Each of
the Four MLP Cases.

Computing System
Network

Raspberry PI

Tinkerboard

2HL 100%

2.514 mJ

2.215 mJ

2HL 50%

2.274 mJ

2.180 mJ

1HL 100%

1.517 mJ

1.519 mJ

1HL 50%

1.595 mJ

1.535 mJ

Table X. Energy Per Packet During Testing for Each of the Computing Systems Executing Each of
the Four MLP Cases.

Computing System
Network

Raspberry PI

Tinkerboard

2HL 100%

37.494 µJ

29.738 µJ

2HL 50%

36.054 µJ

27.785 µJ

1HL 100%

28.402 µJ

22.990 µJ

1HL 50%

27.289 µJ

19.235 µJ
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Time Analysis
Lastly, computation time per packet was examined for each of the MLP cases.
These values correlate closely to the energy numbers for each of the minicomputer
systems. However, timing data was also collected for a notebook computer running 64-bit
Windows 10 Pro with an Intel Core i7-6700HQ CPU @ 2.6 GHz with 16 GB RAM to
provide a baseline time value. In the future, we will also determine a fair way to measure
energy consumption for traditional full sized computing systems.
When comparing Tables XI and XII, a consistent speedup of two orders of
magnitude is observed when testing as opposed to training. This correlates to the energy
values presented as well. To determine the speedup gained from a higher power system, a
summary is presented in Table XIII. Each of the minicomputers are significantly slower
than the Core i7 system. Thus, a user’s hardware selection may be based on expected data
throughput in addition to power requirements. For example, one of the low power
systems could be more appropriate for a communication network that is used less
frequently. The significant time and energy increases when moving from an MLP with a
single hidden layer to one with two hidden layers should also be considered. These two
systems did not provide a statistically significant difference in accuracy, but a 30%
increase in cost (considering time and energy during testing) is required to add a second
hidden layer to these networks.
Table XI. Execution Time Per Packet During Training for Each of the Computing Systems Executing
Each of the Four MLP Cases.

Computing System
Network

Raspberry PI Tinkerboard Core i7

2HL 100% 871.365 µs

445.571 µs

69.389 µs

2HL 50%

854.989 µs

450.356 µs

69.143 µs

1HL 100% 561.846 µs

312.310 µs

49.678 µs

1HL 50%

314.719 µs

50.689 µs

600.609 µs
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Table XII. Execution Time Per Packet During Testing for Each of the Computing Systems Executing
Each of the Four MLP Cases.

Computing System
Network

Raspberry PI Tinkerboard Core i7

2HL 100% 14.564 µs

6.063 µs

0.817 µs

2HL 50%

14.422 µs

6.157 µs

0.690 µs

1HL 100% 11.067 µs

4.459 µs

0.798 µs

1HL 50%

4.413 µs

0.600 µs

11.004 µs

Table XIII. Time Factors Showing How Much Speedup is Obtained for Each System When in a
Testing Mode.

Computing System
Network

Raspberry PI

Tinkerboard

Core i7

2HL

17.83×

7.42×

1×

1HL

13.87×

5.59×

1×
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Conclusion
This work examines operation of a perceptron based intrusion detection system
implemented on low power hardware. A power, energy, timing, and accuracy design
space analysis was performed to quantify the benefits of portable low power intrusion
detection. Greater than 99% accuracy is achieved using the proposed multilayer
perceptron algorithm. Using low power hardware, a scan rate of greater than 226,000
packets per second can be achieved while consuming less than 5 Watts of power.
We have several ideas for future work including a more complete power analysis
that includes optimized desktop hardware. We would like to further examine the
relationship between network complexity and accuracy for network intrusion detection in
order to develop a relationship between network power consumption and accuracy. We
would also like to implement alternative neural network algorithms that may be more
suited to recognizing zero day attacks that utilize in-situ training.
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